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The Status of Political Theory in the Study of Politics
JOOINN LEE 1
University of Minnesota, Morris
ABSTRACT - A general consensus among political scientists during the last decade seems to indicate that political science as a discipline will have a brighter future if it is guided by an approach
that is behaviorally relevant; political theory is the least significant field of political science because
it is least relevant to a behavioral treatment of the discipline. In this study, the author challenges
such behavioral contempt for political theory by presenting his vindications of the importance and
value of political theory. Furthermore, he attempts to locate political theory in a proper and
legitimate place in the study of politics.

The emergence of political behavioralism, as a central
concern of political science during the course of the present c'entury, seemed to lead to the impression that political theory had lost its importance and been dethroned. 2
Some scholars and students of political science even regarded political theory as an intruder from alien academic disciplines such as philosophy and history, into
political science. In current political science, they contc:nded, political theory could not meet the challenge arising on the frontiers of the study of politics. Political science in the mid-twentieth century should, therefore, de. pend upon more and more specialization and less and
less generalization. Traditional political theory, as an aggregation of independent guiding principles of political
activities is doomed to be replaced by the empirical accessibility of political phenomena. Thus, they have attempted to hatch a new political science under behavioral
wings.
A few months ago, Somit and Tanenhaus (1963: 941
ff.) revealed the result of a recent questionnaire on the
state of American political science. According to their
survey, general politics and behavioralism is more frequently cited as the most significant field (22.6 per cent
of respondents), whereas political theory is more frequently rated as a field in which the least significant work
is being done (32.4 per cent of respondents). This result is a startling reversal of the findings made by the
Committee for the Advancement of Teaching of the
American Political Science Association (1951 :xv and
126 ff.) slightly over a decade ago. The committee reported, at that time, that political theory was regarded
most frequently as the most important core of political
science. Probably the most amazing fact is that the inversion of findings has occurred within such a short in-.
terval.
Is this trend in American political science a wholesome advancement toward its perfection? Can the con1 B.A., summa cum laude, Yonsei University; M.A., University of North Dakota, 1958, and Ph.D., University of Illinois,
1962, in political science. Since 1961, at University of Minnesota, Morris, where he is currently Assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and advisor of the International
Relations Club.
2
The eclipse of political theory as a discipline has been variously described as "having entered upon a time of trouble"
(Smith, 1957:734); as "decline of political theory" (Easton,
1951:36-58; and Cobban, 1953:321-37); and as "dearth of political theory" (Greaves, 1960: 3).
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temporary behavioral approach depending upon experimental laboratory techniques of the current century ignore the rich heritage of political theory descending from
classic times? The enthusiasts of behavioralism are apt
to declare that political theorists earn for themselves the
appellation of political searchers of the normative, and
as such, a relic of the dead past, worthy of being relegated to some forgotten limbo. Nothing would be more
absurb than treating political theorists in such manner.
For reckless and total denial of the merit of political theory would only lead to cutting the subject off at its very
root. 3 Empiricism is useful and essential in contemporary
research, but without the help of nonempirical studies,
such research would be full of shortcomings. Empiricism,
in essence, holds that only facts are real; values are subjective, and, therefore, incapable of lending themselves
to scientific treatment. Evaluation and generalization
must be kept at a minimum if the empirical canons are
to be followed in research. 4 In extreme cases, the observer, in order not to violate scientific objectivity, is not
allowed to take sides on issues nor permitted to make
moral judgments of "what is good or bad, better or best"
(Lippincott, 1950:219).
It may, then, be asked, in criticism of the empirical,
whether the real consists exclusively of facts. Is it not
a false conception of scientific method that facts are capable of arranging themselves spontaneously as if Engels'
administration of things would occur automatically? The
truth is that it is the political theorists who furnish order
and meaning by systematizing ideas based on individual
facts. As Friedrich (1958:188) stated, as long as politics deal with contingent matters, scienticism merely
based on empiricism is not always workable. Waldo
(1956:20) once pointed out that contemporary political
science might be considered to be engaged in an intensive "quest for the real." To discover reality, however,
it is not enough to rely exclusively on methods used in
natural science. A mere accumulation of a number of
scientific studies, according to Hyneman (1959:79), does
3
The fear that our universities will face a dilemma if a narrowing of the subject of politics occurs is well described by Appleby (1950:931).
• The danger of relying exclusively on the scientific method is
that scholars ignore not only what science has shown to be
false, but also what science has not yet proved true or false, i.e.,
matters on which science has not yet given its verdict. Cf., Plamenatz (1960:43).
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not make for science. It may be claimed that a science
of politics exists when "we are convinced that we have
formulated a substantial body of generalizations that fit
together in a structure of knowledge."
There is a strong tendency among some contemporary
political scientists to identify the subject of political science with the study of one or other of the following concepts to the exclusion of all others: power, group, process, equilibrium, action, decision making, game, role,
field, etc. But it can be legitimately asked if these phenomena could be studied without political theory. As the
bulk of criticisms of the classics usually comes from
those who have not read them, so many who regard political theory as outmoded, do not know what it is.
The term political theory, of course, has various
shades of meanings. It is used in connection with notions
such as political ideology, political doctrine, political
thought, political ideas, political philosophy, and even
political myth (Jenkin, 19 5 5: 10) . Political theory may
be referred to as a "consummation of explanation"
(Brecht, 1959: 14); or it may be concerned with political
belief systems of general and comprehensive forms (Van
Dyke, 1960: 92); or it may consist of systematizations of
facts (Easton, 1959: 52-62); or else it penetrates to principles that are bound by history and rely on the methods
of metaphysical symbolization (Voeglin, 1952:64).
Political theory is a relatively broad concept. Political
theory is not exactly identical with political philosophy.
As theorizing assumes a role of paramount importance in
the directing of several inquiries, including those that pretend to be no more than the collecting of data, political
theorists should be "part scientist and part philosopher"
(Hacker, 1961 :2). Therefore, I contend that political
theory, in order to fulfill its multiple functions, possesses
within itself the apparatus to deal with the normative.
Normative questions refer to ethical problems that are
concerned with inquiries into beliefs about ends, goals,
values, and an examination of the conceptions of the
good, the right, and the just. Since political theory also
includes substantial amounts of description and explanation, it would be erroneous to limit its study solely to
normative consideration. A political theorist is more a
theory builder than a commentator. An even more tragic
error, however, would be to effect an artificial separation
between the political and the moral, thereby reducing the
former practically to the level of mere statistical description.
Behavioral contempt for theory should be halted,
therefore, at least for a moment, so that the value and
significance of political theory can be examined. Human
beings are not mechanical robots, and, consequently, scientific study by empirical methods suffers from inherent
limitations when applied to human behavior. Subjective
judgments cannot be entirely kept out (Charlesworth,
1962). We cannot dispense with such principles as jus~tice, order, authority, freedom, and value judgment
(Strauss, 1959: I, II, and III). Political theory has its
own inherited jurisdiction that other disciplines cannot
invade without doing violence to it. It is very dangerous
for us to regard the empirical method as the only route to
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knowledge. The artificial dichotomy between theorists
and behaviorists, and between facts and values, is a spurious dichotomy. For polarization of political science
might mean disintegration of political science. It is why
I can share Cook's criticism of contemporary American
political science when he wrote the following statement:
... political science in the United States has grown
rapidly as an independent discipline, but that, largely
through that very rapidity, it is more independent
than disciplined, has revolted unduly against its progenitors, and has become as rootless as it is active
(Cook, 19:75).

It is admitted here that without data, generalizations
cannot be made with any degree of validity. A "theory"
not based on facts cannot be so regarded in the true
sense of the term. But an over-emphasis of facts, and an
indulgence in what Easton terms "hyperfactualism," that
is, studying political science as a subject in which fact is
first and last and everything, would lead to a stultification of the discipline as a whole. Political science would
then be reduced to the mere task of collecting data. Data
forms only one part of the whole enterprise of political
science. It should be recognized that data as "one part"
must never be mistaken for the whole. While scholars like
Key and Truman have no doubt made admirable contributions to political science, their works do not constitute
a description of the entire gamut of political science. To
treat them ~s the very representatives of the entire character of poliftcal science would be equivalent to treating
technique as an end in itself, as a master rather than as
a useful tool.
Over-simplification and over-specialization, while
making use of facts, may detract seriously from viewing
a body of facts in its holistic implications. Even Bentley
( 1949) did not seem to encourage the tendency of scholars to fall into a confusion between goal and process. 5
His followers, however, often neglected his concern
and have engaged in the study of the process to such an
extent that the goal is repeatedly obfuscated. It might,
then, be said that Bentley is not a Bentleyian in the sense
supposed by some of his followers.
There is a difference between field studies, as they are
understood in the social sciences, and laboratory findings,
as they are understood in the physical sciences. As long
as political scientists are academic researchers they must
not abandon the academic spirit of inquiry and give up
the scholarly approach as their ideal. Such a tendency
would be suicidal. By giving up the scholarly ideal, they
would stand midway between the scholar and the practitioner, without being either in a proper sense. They
would, indeed, have fallen between the proverbial two
stools.
What is practical to the behavioralists might appear
effete to the practitioner. The reality hardened politician
may well, from his viewpoint of a political practitioner,
regard the behavioralists as starry-eyed idealists. In a
5
Bentley preferred the content of the process to the barren
formalism, but he did not reject all "soul-stuffs," except only
specific ones. He did not disregard the validity of real and true
"ideas," "feelings," and "faculties" (Bentley, 1949:Ch. V).
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nonpunitive vein, I wish to avow that political scientists
as scholars cannot help being idealistic to some extent,
because to be idealistic means to lead the study of politics
forward and beyond the mere reach of the bare facts of
the present. The political scientists must, therefore, adopt
the scientific method with the necessary caution and circumspection, and must be fully aware of pitfalls accompanying a blind and total acceptance of a purely empirical approach that subjectively rejects in toto all other
conceptualizations in the dynamic exploration of political science.
I would, indeed, find myself in agreement with Crick's
argument that "the understanding of the American political tradition becomes more and more rational instead
of reasonable. For it has been technology, and not science, that has been the real master-concept for most
American political scientists" (Crick, 1959 :237). Perhaps, the loss resulting from the technological approach
is that such studies are.in danger of losing their rarified
qualities. It is more than absurb for a political scientist
to demand that he should "comply with 'logical positivism' or else plead guilty to being a 'metaphysician' "
(Strauss, 1962:314). I might go along with Kelsen's
polemics that although "science must be separated from
politics, politics need not be separated from science"
(Kelsen, 1959:357). Yet, I would hesitate to accept
Jacobson's thesis that "moralism is no more a synonym
for political theory than is scientism" ( Jacobson, 19 5 8:
121). For it is right for political theory to attach importance to the scientific factors, but it is wholly erroneous
to conclude that the ethical residue of political theory is
worthless.
What I claim here is that political theory must be esteemed properly and given its due place. Political theory
is not mere "guesswork." Perhaps the prime significance
of political theory lies in its capability of directing man's
action. Conceding that it cannot always give direction to
human action-a vantage point of attack by the idealists
-it can, at least, clarify issues and indicate possible and
even probable consequences of political activities. As
Eckstein reported, .. ''.. . . analysis of the Greats at least
sharpens the wits, deepens the imagination, and refines
one's critical powers . . . " (Eckstein, 1956:482). A
total rejection of political philosophy in the name of science might prove to be self-defeating. For, "If political
philosophy is valuable as a source of data, it is also valuable as a source of ideas for analyzing the data. The history of political thought is indisputably a gold-mine of
concepts, models, hypotheses, and methods which may
turn out to be useful even in the analysis of contemporary political behavior" (Eckstein, 1956:485) .6
Even those who reject political theory must know theory so that they can attack it from knowledge rather than
ignorance. Otherwise, we have a technical equipment for
going somewhere without proper knowledge of where to
go. We are fully aware that tools and materials are useless without a proper blueprint in building a house. How• For a more detailed study on the contribution of classical
political theories, see Sibley ( 1958: 125-48).
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ever, in using the tools and materials of political science,
do not the discipline's architects too often forget the
blueprint of political science which is the crystallization
of both classical, eclectic, and modern analytic theories?
Hence, political scientists should be above and beyond
any temptation of considering political theory as a target of disparagement simply for reasons of academic
amour propre. Since the function of political theory is
to determine the means, goals, and ultimate values that
should govern the life of changing political society, "it
is always new as well as always old, and . . . constantly
changing even while it remains same" (Barker, 1928:42
ff).

Thus, in my opinion, ·empiricists would neither be
"dead-end kids" nor "founding fathers" of political science. Political scientists must be neither "high-flying theorists" nor "down-to-earth practitioners." Lasswell, Cat·lin, and several others have changed radically from their
early positions which they modified to take values and
goals into account. 7 Easton and Brecht are concerned
with scientifically warranted assertions, but never neglect
to admit the significance and importance of nonscientific
thinking.
. . . there remains a gap which Scientific Method is
indeed unable to close: the absolute validity of ultimate standards that underlie human value judgments
cannot be established through this method (Brecht,
1959:484).

The chief intention of political theorists is not only to
stress the importance of political philosophy, but also to
implore both political philosophers and empirical political scientists to improve their methods and perceptions.
It does not matter what the sciences are called-whether
they be Windelband's nomothetic science or ideographic
science, meta-politics or meta-theory. Political theorists
must not divorce their thinking from the practical problems and realities of the world and · the time in which
they live.
Without doubt, current political science and traditional
political science are not the same but they are by no
means incompatible with each other (Kirkpatrick, 1962:
19-29). We should not guide reality only from mere
j1istification of principles, but, at the same time, we
should not be captives of crude empiricism. The danger
of the behavioral approach is that it may result in scientific infantilism unless it actively strives for sound theorizations. Thus, theorization is the prerequisite for
wholesome perfection of political science as an academic
discipline. Lasswell well pointed out the direction of future political science, "The future in this [political science] is partly open to direction through keener insight
into the goals, assets, and liabilities of the self" (Lasswell,
1963: 242). The problems presented before political scientists are no longer the choice between "formalism"
and "vulgarism." Peaceful co-existence between theory
and behaviorism alone is not sufficient. Mutual coordi7
Cf., Lasswell's later writings, especially the 1958 postscript
to his Politics, Who Gets What, When, How. See Catlin (1957:21) and Merriam (1950-248).
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nation and cooperation should be made in the direction
of theory building as a core of political enterprise. Consequently, I cannot help watching with apprehension
rather than with approbation the allegation of political
scientists that political theory is the least significant field
of the study of politics.
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